Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case by Rentschler, Lucas & Turocy, Theodore L.
Two-bidder all-pay auctions
with interdependent valuations,
including the highly competitive case1
Lucas Rentschler
Centro Vernon Smith de Economı´a Experimental
Universidad Francisco Marroquin
Guatemala, Guatemala
lrentschler@ufm.edu
Theodore L. Turocy
School of Economics and
Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science
University of East Anglia
Norwich, United Kingdom
T.Turocy@uea.ac.uk
November 24, 2015
1We thank conference participants at the UECE Lisbon Meetings 2014, seminar participants at Univer-
sity of East Anglia, the Economic Science Institute at Chapman University, and the University of South
Carolina, as well as Subhasish Modak Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock, Emiliya Lazarova, and Ron Siegel, for
very useful suggestions in improving this work. The comments of the editor and two anonymous refer-
ees have been instrumental in sharpening the exposition of our results. We claim property rights over any
remaining errors.
Abstract
We analyze symmetric, two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations and discrete
type spaces. Relaxing previous restrictions on the distribution of types and the valuation structure,
we present a construction that characterizes all symmetric equilibria. We show how the search
problem this construction faces can be complex. In equilibrium, randomization can take place over
disjoint intervals of bids, equilibrium supports can have a rich structure, and non-monotonicity of
the equilibrium may result in a positive probability of allocative inefficiency when the value of the
prize is not common. Particular attention is paid to the case in which an increase in a bidder’s
posterior expected value of winning the auction is likely to be accompanied by a corresponding
increase for the other bidder. Such environments are “highly competitive” in the sense that the
bidder’s higher valuation also signals that the other bidder has an incentive to bid aggressively.
JEL Classifications: D44; D82; D72.
Keywords: contests, all-pay auctions, mixed strategies.
1 Introduction
Consider an emerging industry, in which potential entrants are considering irrevocable research
and development investments to develop a new product. It is believed the entrant who develops the
best product will dominate. Suppose an entrant privately observes information which suggests that
demand in the industry will be high, so the successful firm will obtain high profits. Higher profits
are good news for the entrant – provided it is the entrant who will obtain them! If a competitor is
likely to observe similar information, then the entrant may expect to face fierce competition in the
research and development stage; this is bad news. Because such information is both good and bad
news, determining what equilibrium behavior will look like is a potentially difficult problem.
Much existing research in all-pay auction models has ruled out this case by restricting the dis-
tributions of types such that being a “higher” type is unambiguously good news. This occurs, for
example, if types are statistically independent; see e.g., Amann and Leininger (1996). In a setting
with affiliated values and continuous strategy and type spaces Krishna and Morgan (1997) formu-
late a condition such that increasing a bidder’s type is unambiguously good news for that bidder; in
their words, this rules out the case that types and values are “too affiliated.” With that assumption,
bidding strategies and equilibrium payoffs are monotonically increasing in type. More recently,
Siegel (2014) analyzes a setting with finite sets of types under a discrete analogue of the assump-
tion of Krishna and Morgan, but without requiring affiliation. He shows that equilibrium bidding
strategies are monotonic in a stochastic sense, and provides a constructive algorithm for finding
equilibrium. Siegel notes that “it would be valuable to extend the analysis to...non-monotonic
equilibria.”
This paper carries out that extension by providing a complete analysis of symmetric equilibria
in symmetric, two-bidder all-pay auctions with a finite set of types. This complements the work of
Krishna and Morgan and of Siegel by bringing into focus the role that monotonicity assumptions
play both in the structure of equilibria, and in the complexity of constructing an equilibrium. We
provide a characterization of all symmetric equilibria, and we show that there always exists a
symmetric equilibrium in which all types randomize in a piecewise-uniform way over a finite
number of intervals of bids.
One way in which monotonicity may fail is when types are highly correlated. For example,
suppose the two entrants in the emerging industry from the first paragraph base their judgments
in part on public information, and/or use similar methodologies. Then, their information about
the profitability of the market (their types) will be strongly correlated, as will their posterior as-
sessments of the value of winning. In this sense, the contest can be thought of as being highly
competitive. In addition to being economically plausible, there are models in the literature on
winner-pay auctions with exactly this property. A prominent example is found in Kagel and Levin
2
(1986) and Casari et al. (2007), who employ a model in which there is a common value, and condi-
tional on that common value each bidder receives a signal about the value which is an independent
draw from a uniform distribution over a small interval centered on the true value. This environment
does not satisfy the Krishna-Morgan-Siegel monotonicity condition. Athey (2001) notes that the
single crossing property fails in all-pay auctions with this information structure.
Relatively accurate information is not required for resulting equilibria to be non-monotonic.
To illustrate this, we analyze in Section 4.3 a common-value setting in which the Krishna-Morgan-
Siegel monotonicity requirement is not satisfied even when the private information of different
types is very inaccurate.
There are therefore multiple classes of models of potential economic interest in which equi-
libria are not monotonic. In any case in which values are not purely common, this has important
implications for the allocative efficiency of the all-pay mechanism, because it implies that the
highest-value contestant need not be the one who wins the auction. It is then interesting to ask
how inefficiency depends on the parameters of the information and valuation structures. Also, in
settings which do not satisfy the Krishna-Morgan-Siegel monotonicity condition, equilibrium need
not be unique, and equilibrium payoffs may differ for some or all types in different equilibria.
To allow us to analyze these issues, we provide an algorithm which constructs all symmetric
piecewise-uniform equilibria. This algorithm can be viewed as an extension of the construction
in Siegel (2014). In some settings, it is possible to have equilibria in which randomization is
not piecewise-uniform over all intervals. It is also possible, under particular conditions, to have
equilibria in which the equilibrium support for a type consists of an arbitrarily large number of
disjoint components. We show that for any such non-piecewise-uniform or non-finite equilibrium,
there exists a corresponding finite, piecewise-uniform equilibrium with similar properties. Our
construction diagnoses the existence of these other types of equilibria.
The algorithm identifies which subsets of types can simultaneously include the same bid in
their supports within an equilibrium behavior strategy; we call these admissible active sets. We
relate possible equilibrium structures to a partial ordering over these admissible active sets; any
equilibrium corresponds to some path through the graph induced by this partial ordering. When
the Krishna-Morgan-Siegel monotonicity condition does not hold, this graph can become complex,
and therefore the number of paths the construction must consider can grow rapidly. The graph of
the partial ordering therefore helps to visualize the complexity of identifying an equilibrium in the
general case.
This paper contributes to the growing literature on all-pay auctions. In a complete information
environment, Baye et al. (1996) characterizes the set of equilibria. Siegel (2009) and Siegel (2010)
recently greatly increased the understanding of complete information environments by allowing
for a variety of asymmetries among bidders. In addition, Tullock contests, in which the highest
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bidder does not win with certainty, are the subject of a similarly growing literature; see e.g., Tullock
(1980) and Cornes and Hartley (2005).
Introducing incomplete information into both all-pay auctions and Tullock contests substan-
tially complicates analysis. The literature regarding incomplete information predominantly focuses
on all-pay auctions.1 Much of the analysis considers the case of independent types. Morath and
Mu¨nster (2008) demonstrate that all-pay auctions generate lower expected revenue if the vector of
valuations is common knowledge relative to the case in which each bidder’s valuation is private
information. Amann and Leininger (1996) examine the two-bidder case under independent private
values in which valuations need not be drawn from the same distribution. Kirkegaard (2007) con-
siders comparative statics in the case of ex-ante heterogeneous bidders and finds that total effort
expenditure may increase when one bidder gets weaker. Kirkegaard (2010) also considers such
ex-ante asymmetry and also allows for the presence of handicapped bidders, as well as advan-
taged bidders whose bids are costlessly increased by an additive bonus. In all the environments
considered, equilibrium is monotonic.
When types are not independent, in general a monotonicity assumption is imposed on the dis-
tribution of types which guarantees that equilibria will be monotonic. In addition to the already-
mentioned analyses of Krishna and Morgan (1997) and Siegel (2014), Harstad (1995) and Lizzeri
and Persico (2000) both adopt this approach. An important exception is Lu and Parreiras (2014),
who extend Amann and Leininger (1996) by allowing for correlated types and interdependent val-
uations in an environment with continuous type and strategy spaces. They provide a necessary and
sufficient condition for the existence of monotonic equilibria. They also compute a non-monotonic
equilibrium in a setting with quadratic valuations. Another exception is Einy et al. (2013), which
examines common-value environments with a finite set of states of the world which determine
the value of winning the auction. Bidders are ex-ante asymmetrically informed in that they differ
according to their ability to distinguish between possible values of winning the auction. They char-
acterize the equilibrium in mixed strategies and show that the probability of winning the auction
and the expected bids are the same for better and less informed bidders.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 proves
existence of an equilibrium, and presents the constructive algorithm.2 Section 4 analyzes some
selected cases which illustrate what equilibria can look like, and illustrates that the challenge
of finding equilibria can increase rapidly outside the set of environments satisfying the Krishna-
Morgan-Siegel monotonicity condition. Section 5 concludes with a discussion. For conciseness in
1There are some notable exceptions. For example, the case of common-value Tullock contests with asymmetric
information has been studied in Wa¨rneryd (2003) and Wa¨rneryd (2008).
2An implementation of the construction, including analysis of all of the examples presented in this paper, is written
in Python and available under the terms of the GNU General Public License from the corresponding author’s website
at http://www.gambit-project.org/turocy.
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the exposition, we relegate proofs to appendices.
2 Model
We consider symmetric, two-bidder all-pay auctions with a single, indivisible prize. Each bidder’s
type is private information, and is from a finite set T , with typical element tk. After observing their
types, bidders simultaneously submit bids, which can be any nonnegative real number. Each bid is
irrevocably sunk, but only the bidder with the higher of the bids wins the prize. In the event of a
tie the winner is determined by a fair randomization, although in symmetric equilibrium ties are a
zero-probability event.
A bidder’s valuation of the prize may depend on both her and her opponent’s types in any
arbitrary way. Let Vk,l > 0 denote the posterior expected value of the prize to a bidder, conditional
on being type tk while the other bidder is type tl. Given that a bidder is type tk, write the conditional
probability that the other bidder is type tl as hl|k. We assume that hk|k > 0 for all types tk.
The values V and conditional probabilities h are sufficient to define the payoff functions for
the model. In several examples, it will be convenient, for the purpose of exposition, to motivate
or calculate h and V in terms of an underlying state of the world. When this is employed, Ω will
denote the set of states of the world, with typical elements written using ω with subscripts.
We consider symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria. A behavior strategy Π assigns to each type tk
a corresponding probability distribution Πk over bids. For any Lebesgue-measurable subset B of
bids, Πk : B → R+ denotes the probability that the bidder will choose a bid in B. We endow the
set of behavior strategies with the topology of weak convergence.
The expected payoff to a bidder who bids b, conditional on being type tk, assuming the oppo-
nent bids according to Π, is
uk(b|Π) =
∑
l:tl∈T
hl|kVk,l
[
Πl([0, b)) +
Πl({b})
2
]
− b. (1)
For notational compactness, we define the quantity ψl|k ≡ hl|kVk,l.
Siegel (2014) provides a procedure for computing equilibria in two-bidder all-pay auctions
(symmetric or asymmetric), under the assumption that for every tl ∈ T , ψl|k is strictly increasing
in tk. This assumption is a discrete analogue of the sufficient condition for existence of symmet-
ric and monotonic equilibrium in the case of continuous types with affiliated values identified in
Krishna and Morgan (1997). We will refer to this condition as KMS. In games in which KMS is
satisfied, the unique equilibrium involves piecewise-uniform randomization of bids, such that the
support of the equilibrium mixed strategy is a connected interval for all types. This equilibrium
is stochastically monotonic. That is, for any two types tk and tl with k > l, if b is in the support
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of Πl and b′ is in the support of Πk, then b′ ≥ b. Unlike Krishna and Morgan (1997), the results
and construction by Siegel (2014), and those in this paper, does not require affiliation of types and
values.
One way in which KMS may fail to hold is due to extreme correlation, either positive or neg-
ative, between private values. Consider a private-values environment with two types, in which
V1,1 = V1,0 = VH and V0,1 = V0,0 = VL, with VH > VL. For any σ ∈ [0, 1], let h1|1 = h0|0 = σ
and h0|1 = h1|0 = 1 − σ. The case of σ = 12 corresponds to independently-determined values,
with σ > 1
2
resulting in positive correlation and σ < 1
2
negative correlation. KMS requires that
vL
vH
< σ
1−σ <
vH
vL
, that is, the values cannot be too highly correlated, either positively or negatively.
Our construction provides the equilibrium for all values of σ.3 However, KMS is not a condition
that only rules out extreme correlation. In Example 5 below, we present a model of interdependent
valuations, in which bidders have identity-dependent preferences regarding the value of winning
the prize. Although the bidders’ values are statistically uncorrelated, nevertheless the environment
does not satisfy KMS.
3 Characterizing and constructing equilibria
Proposition 1. In any symmetric equilibrium Π, for all types tk, both Πk([0, b)) and uk(b|Π) are
Lipschitz-continuous functions of b.
Proposition 2. There exists a symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A for proofs of both Propositions 1 and 2
Neither KMS nor affiliation is required for existence.4 However, when KMS is not satisfied, the
structure of equilibria can become quite complex. In what follows, we develop an algorithm which
constructs all the symmetric equilibria in which the cumulative distribution of bids is piecewise
linear for all types, and characterizes all other symmetric equilibria, if they exist. This algorithm
can be viewed as an extension of the construction presented by Siegel (2014).
Given an equilibrium Π, let θk(Π) be the expected payoff of a bidder of type tk. Because
uk(b|Π) is continuous in b, the set of best responses BRk(Π) = {b : uk(b|Π) = θk(Π)} is a closed
set. Let Ek(Π) be the set of boundary points of BRk(Π) which are not isolated points. That is,
Ek(Π) = {b : ∃δ > 0 s.t. ∀0 < ε < δ, (b−ε, b+ε)∩BRk(Π) 6= ∅∧(b−ε, b+ε)∩(B\BRk(Π)) 6=
3This is comparable to Example 1 in Siegel (2014). Our software implementation includes this model as an
implemented example.
4The fact that equilibria are without atoms is a consequence both of having only two bidders, and of symmetry.
Baye et al. (1996) exhibit equilibria with atoms in cases with asymmetries between bidders, and with more than two
bidders. Siegel (2014) exhibit such equilibria in asymmetric two-bidder environments.
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∅}.5 Write E(Π) = ∪k:tk∈TEk(Π). Because in equilibrium no bidder would ever submit a positive
bid without a positive probability of winning, the probability the other bidder makes a lower bid
must be positive, and so inf E(Π) = 0. To construct equilibria, we develop necessary conditions
for an equilibrium which describe how many points E(Π) can contain, which types have boundary
points in their supports at each point inE(Π), and, ultimately, the location of those boundary points
in the space of bids.
Consider any two bids e and e + L, with L > 0, such that (e, e + L) ∩ E(Π) = ∅. On any
such (e, e + L), define A = {tk ∈ T : uk(b|Π) = θk(Π) ∀b ∈ (e, e + L)}. We refer to the set A
as the active set associated with such an interval, in the sense that the constraint uk(b|Π) ≤ θk(Π)
required by equilibrium is binding or active for types in A. When referring to a given active set A,
we say that tk is active if tk ∈ A.
In any equilibrium Π the net payoff change on (e, e+ L) for the types in A must be zero. That
is, the system of equations∑
l:tl∈T
ψl|k [Πl([0, e+ L))− Πl([0, e))] = L ∀k : tk ∈ A (2)
must have a solution such that Πk([0, e+L)) ≥ Πk([0, e)) for all k : tk ∈ A, and Πk([0, e+L)) =
Πk([0, e)) for all k : tk ∈ T\A. This condition does not depend on the absolute level of bids,
and can be expressed using only the length L and the probability masses µk ≡ Πk([0, e + L)) −
Πk([0, e)) expended by each type tk.
Definition 3. A non-empty subset A ⊆ T of types is an admissible active set if the system∑
l:tl∈T
ψl|kµl = L ∀k : tk ∈ A (3)
has a solution with L ≥ 0, µk ≥ 0 for all k : tk ∈ A, and µk = 0 for all k : tk ∈ T\A.6 Let
µA ≡ (µAk )k:tk∈T . Solutions (LA, µA) satisfying the condition are called supporting solutions for
the admissible active set. Let A denote the set of admissible active sets.
Only sets of types which form admissible active sets can be active over a positive measure of
bids in an equilibrium. Because admissibility is independent of the level of bids, determination of
whether an active set is admissible can be pre-computed, ruling out possibly many active sets from
consideration.7 For many games, |A|  2|T |; in particular, Siegel (2014) shows that KMS implies
5Isolated points in BRk(Π) cannot be boundary points in the support of Πk because the Lipschitz-continuity of
Πk([0, b)) rules out mass points and singular measures. Lipschitz-continuity also ensures Ek(Π) is nonempty.
6Geometrically, admissibility requires that there is an affine hyperplane containing the vectors {ψ·|k}tk∈A. We
thank one of the referees for suggesting this interpretation.
7Because the condition requires nonnegative solutions to a linear set of equations, Farkas’ Lemma is well-suited to
this task.
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that only singleton active sets are admissible.
Any equilibrium then necessarily satisfies∑
l:tl∈T
ψl|kµAl = L
A ∀k : tk ∈ A ∀A ∈ A∑
A∈A
µAk = 1 ∀k : tk ∈ T
µAk ≥ 0 ∀k : tk ∈ A ∀A ∈ A
µAk = 0 ∀k : tk ∈ T\A ∀A ∈ A
LA ≥ 0 ∀A ∈ A. (4)
These conditions constrain, for each admissible active set A ∈ A, the possible allocations of the
measure of bids LA, and the measure of probability mass µAk for each type.
All admissible active sets have families of supporting solutions with at least one dimension. If
the set of supporting solutions for some admissible active set A has one dimension, the supporting
solutions can be parameterized by the interval length LA, and the probability mass expended by
each type is proportional to LA. It then follows that on any interval of bids on which A is the active
set, randomization must be uniform for all types. It is possible to have families of supporting
solutions with two or more dimensions; such an example is provided in Section 4.1. In such a
case randomization over an interval of bids need not be uniform. However, there always exists an
equilibrium with piecewise-uniform randomization.
Proposition 4. There exists a symmetric equilibrium in which randomization is piecewise-uniform
for all types.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In view of Proposition 4, in our construction we restrict attention to equilibria which involve
uniform randomization on each interval. Any equilibrium with non-uniform randomization can
be obtained by constructing an equilibrium with uniform randomization, and then modifying the
randomization on intervals on which the active set has supporting solutions with two or more
dimensions. In any equilibrium with piecewise-uniform randomization, for all types tk ∈ T , the
slope of the payoff function uk(b|Π) is well-defined and constant on each interval (e, e + L) such
that (e, e+ L) ∩ E(Π) = ∅.
A bid e ∈ E(Π) is a point at which the active set differs for bids just above and just below e.
Consider some point e ∈ E(Π), and pick ε > 0 small enough that (e − ε, e + ε) ∩ E(Π) = {e}.
Let A+ denote the active set on (e, e + ε), and A− denote the active set on (e − ε, e). Suppose
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tk ∈ A+ but tk 6∈ A−; then, uk(b|Π) must be increasing on (e− ε, e).8 Similarly, suppose tk 6∈ A+
but tk ∈ A−; then uk(b|Π) must be decreasing on (e, e + ε). These necessary conditions on an
equilibrium suggest a partial ordering  over admissible active sets.
Definition 5. Consider two admissible active sets A and A′. We say A  A′ if, for all types tk,
• If tk ∈ A and tk 6∈ A′, then there exists a supporting solution (LA′ , µA′) for A′ such that∑
l:tl∈T ψl|kµ
A′
l − LA′ > 0.
• If tk 6∈ A and tk ∈ A′, then there exists a supporting solution (LA, µA) for A such that∑
l:tl∈T ψl|kµ
A
l − LA < 0.9
The partial ordering  induces a directed graph Γ on the admissible active sets. Any equi-
librium Π corresponds to some path through Γ. Each point e ∈ E(Π) corresponds to an edge
traversed in the path, with the active set at bids just above e corresponding to the origin of the
edge, and the active set at bids just below e corresponding to the destination of the edge. In set-
tings in which KMS is not satisfied, Γ may become quite complex, and there will be many paths
which do not correspond to an equilibrium. The exhaustive enumeration of these possible paths is
where the computational complexity of identifying equilibria in the general case lies.
In a path through Γ, one or more types tk may be part of an active set at one node, be inactive
over successive nodes, and then return to activity further down the path. If there is an equilibrium
over such a path, the type will exhibit a gap in its support of bids.
Definition 6. A list {aj}n+1j=0 of admissible active sets is a gap subpath of Γ for type tk if
• tk ∈ a0 and tk ∈ an+1;
• tk 6∈ aj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n;
• aj−1  aj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n+ 1.
The set of gap subpaths for type tk is denoted Xk, and the set of all gap subpaths is denoted
X = ∪k:tk∈TXk.
Because the graph Γ is finite, the total number of gap subpaths is also finite.
Let α = {αj} denote some path through Γ. To identify whether there is an equilibrium which
corresponds to α, we extend the conditions (4) to allocate measures of bids and probability mass
8uk(b|Π) cannot be decreasing; if it were, then bids in (e− ε, e) would be strictly better responses for tk. uk(b|Π)
cannot be constant, because then by definition tk ∈ A−.
9Following the geometric interpretation, A  A′ if, whenever tk ∈ A and tk 6∈ A′, the vector ψ·|k lies above some
hyperplane of A′; and whenever tk 6∈ A and tk ∈ A, the vector ψ·|k lies below some hyperplane of A.
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of the behavior strategies to the entries in α.∑
l:tl∈T
ψl|kµ
αj
l = L
αj ∀k : tk ∈ αj ∀αj ∈ α∑
j:αj∈α
µ
αj
k = 1 ∀k : tk ∈ T
µ
αj
k ≥ 0 ∀k : tk ∈ αj ∀αj ∈ α
µ
αj
k = 0 ∀k : tk ∈ T\αj ∀αj ∈ α
Lαj ≥ 0 ∀αj ∈ α. (5)
Further, it must be that there is zero net payoff change over any gap in the support of a type’s
strategy. Letting Ξk = {(j, n) : n > j ∧ {αj′}j′=nj′=j ∈ Xk} be the set of subpaths within α which
correspond to a gap for type tk, we require
n−1∑
j′=j+1
∑
l:tl∈T
ψl|kµ
αj′
l =
n−1∑
j′=j+1
Lαj′ ∀(j, n) ∈ Ξk ∀tk ∈ T. (6)
Therefore, the feasibility problem of whether a particular candidate path α is consistent with an
equilibrium reduces to a system of linear equations and inequalities. Further, note that the solutions
for each admissible active set can be pre-computed, as the set of solutions is independent of where
an active set may occur in a path through Γ.
If Γ is acyclic, all paths α through Γ are finite, and the system (5) and (6) consists of a finite
number of equations and inequalities in a finite number of unknowns. However, whenever there
are at least three types, it is possible to construct games in which Γ has cycles. We explore this pos-
sibility in Example 5 in subsection 4.5. When this occurs, there may be infinitely many equilibria,
each one corresponding to traversing a cycle in Γ a different number of times. However, when there
is an equilibrium in which a cycle is traversed more than once, there is always a corresponding one
in which each gap subpath is traversed no more than once.
Proposition 7. There exists a symmetric equilibrium, in which each type tk randomizes piecewise-
uniformly over no more than |Xk|+ 1 disjoint intervals of bids.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 7 then provides the final piece to ensure that the constructive algorithm terminates.
If Γ is acyclic, then all paths are finite, and the enumeration algorithm will terminate in finite time.
If Γ contains cycles, then it is enough to consider paths such that each gap subpath appears at most
one time; if in traversing the graph a gap subpath is encountered a second time, then that path can
be discarded. In such a case, any equilibrium found involving that gap subpath will correspond to
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a family of equilibria, corresponding to paths through Γ which visit that gap subpath any number
of times.
The equilibrium search algorithm, then, consists of these steps:
1. Determine which active sets are admissible by solving (3).
2. For each admissible active set, use the solutions to (3) and inspect the slopes of the payoff
functions for types not in the admissible active set to construct the graph Γ.
3. Enumerate the paths through Γ. For each path,
(a) Construct the system in (5) and (6).
(b) Determine if the system has any solutions.
(c) For each solution on some path through Γ, construct the corresponding behavior strat-
egy by traversing the path in reverse order, setting the lower bound of the interval of
bids associated with the last active set equal to zero.
(d) For each of these candidate equilibria, determine, for each type, whether the expected
payoff is nonnegative, by computing the expected payoff of the highest bid submitted
by the type.
4 Examples
4.1 Example 1: Common values with highly correlated information
We begin with a common-value setting. Suppose two competitors are vying to develop the tech-
nology and infrastructure to carry out mining activities on asteroids. At least initially, resource
extraction in space will require high capital investments, and so there may be only room for one
viable firm in the industry. While there is uncertainty about the amounts of various minerals, or
useful volatiles such as water, available in asteroids, there is much available data from remote
sensing and exploration missions produced by publicly-funded space exploration bodies, as well
as scientific researchers. Although they will have access to very similar information, the two com-
petitors would likely weight various sources of information in different ways, leading to estimates
for the potential economic value which would not necessarily be identical, but likely would be very
similar to each other.
In the winner-pay auction literature, a model capturing the principal features of this setting
has been analyzed, particularly in the study of the winner’s curse, by Kagel and Levin (1986)
and Casari et al. (2007). The common value of the good is drawn from a uniform distribution.
11
Each bidder’s type is the common value plus a conditionally independent noise term, drawn from
a uniform distribution with a mean of zero. This environment does not satisfy KMS, for any size
of the support of the conditional type distribution.10 Athey (2001) noted that this information
structure does not satisfy the single crossing property. Wang (1991) analyzed this model with a
discrete type space for the first-price auction, and showed that in the symmetric equilibrium types
mix on continuous and non-overlapping intervals. In contrast, in the all-pay auction, most types
randomize over multiple intervals of bids, and multiple types are are in the active set for many of
these intervals.
Example 1. There are K ≥ 3 possible states of the world, Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωK}, with ωk =
k
K
. These correspond to the common value of the prize. There are K + 1 possible types, T =
{t0, t1, . . . , tK}. Conditional on state ωk being realized, each bidder is independently either type
tk−1 or tk, with equal probability. We will refer to types {t1, . . . , tK−1} as interior types. For an
interior type tk, the conditional probability structure satisfies hk−1|k = hk+1|k = 14 and hk|k =
1
2
.
For the end cases, we have h1|0 = h0|0 = hK−1|K = hK|K = hk|k = 12 . All other conditional
probabilities are zero.
Turning to conditional expected values, it is useful to define ∆ = 1
2K
. For any pair of interior
types tk−1 and tk, we have Vk,k =
k+ 1
2
K
= (2k + 1)∆ and Vk−1,k = kK = 2k∆. Changing
either type from tk−1 to tk increases the posterior expected value by ∆. Types t0 and tK are
special because each can infer the value with certainty, and so V0,0 = V0,1 = 1K = 2∆ and
VK−1,K = VK,K = 1 = 2K∆.
As an illustration of the operation of the constructive procedure, we first present in some detail
the calculation of the equilibria of this game for the case of K = 3. There are 15 possible active
sets; of these, 12 are admissible. The graph Γ induced by  over these admissible active sets is
shown in Figure 1a.11 Table 1 lists the admissible active sets and the corresponding supporting
solutions. It also tabulates the slopes of the payoff function for types not in the active set; the signs
of these determine the edges in the graph of Figure 1a. Of note is the case when all types are active.
Here, the required admissibility conditions for any three types imply the fourth. Therefore, the set
of supporting solutions for this active set is two-dimensional.
In this game, there is one family of equilibria, corresponding to one path through this graph,
which is summarized in Table 2. The equilibrium conditions can be expressed in terms of five
variables: four interval lengths Lα0 , Lα1 , Lα2 , and Lα3 , and the mass µα30 expended on α3 by type
10Having the tails of the distribution fall to zero outside the interval makes for convenience in analysis. For KMS to
be violated, it is enough to have the tails of the distribution tending to zero at a fast enough rate.
11Where we show the graphs, for compactness, we only show paths on which all types are active in at least one
node, and which originate at the active set corresponding to the highest-bidding active set in the equilibrium. The node
labels refer to the indices of the active types.
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µAk
∑
l:tl∈T ψl|kµ
A
l /L
A − 1
A t0 t1 t2 t3 t0 t1 t2 t3
t3 0 0 0 2LA −1 −1 −12
t2 0 0 125 L
A 0 −1 −3
5
+1
5
t1 0 4LA 0 0 −13 −13 −1
t1 t3 0 4LA 0 2LA −13 +16
t1t2 0 3611L
A 12
11
LA 0 − 5
11
− 5
11
t0 6LA 0 0 0 −12 −1 −1
t0 t3 6LA 0 0 2LA −12 −12
t0 t2 6LA 0 125 L
A 0 − 1
10
+1
5
t0t1 3LA 3LA 0 0 −12 −1
t0t1 t3 3LA 3LA 0 2LA 0
t0t1t2 5LA 1LA 2LA 0 0
t0t1t2t3 pL
A 6LA − p p− 3LA 5LA − p
Table 1: Summary of admissible active sets in the common-values with highly correlated types
model with K = 3. The first group of columns summarizes the supporting solutions for each
admissible active set; there is a two-dimensional family of solutions for the active set {t0, t1, t2, t3},
parameterized by p ∈ [3, 5]. The second group of columns reports the slopes of the payoff functions
for types not in the active set.
µAk
∑
l:tl∈T ψl|kµ
A
l /L
A − 1
A t0 t1 t2 t3 t0 t1 t2 t3
α0 t3 0 0 0 2Lα0 −1 −1 −12
α1 t2 0 0 125 L
α1 0 −1 −3
5
+1
5
α2 t1t2 0 3611L
α2 12
11
Lα2 0 − 5
11
− 5
11
α3 t0t1t2t3 pL
α3 6Lα3 − p p− 3Lα3 5Lα3 − p
Table 2: Path of active sets corresponding to equilibrium in the common-values with highly corre-
lated types model with K = 3.
13
02
012
03
012313
013
12
3
2
(a) The graph Γ of admissible active sets.
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Type
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(b) Schematic of equilibrium support. Bars indicate
intervals of bids on which the corresponding type is
active. Horizontal dashing indicates bids at which the
active set changes.
Figure 1: Visualization of admissible active sets and equilibrium in the common-values with highly
correlated types model with K = 3.
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t0. The integrate-to-one conditions for each type are, respectively,
µα30 =1
36
11
Lα2 + 6Lα3−µα30 =1
12
5
Lα1+
12
11
Lα2 − 3Lα3+µα30 =1
2Lα0 + 5Lα3−µα30 =1.
In addition, there is one gap subpath, for type t3 between α0 and α3, requiring that
1
5
Lα1 − 5
11
Lα2 = 0.
These equations have a unique solution, given by µα30 = 1, L
α0 = 1
3
, Lα1 = 5
18
, Lα2 = 11
90
,
Lα3 = 4
15
. Because all types are active at a bid of zero, it follows immediately that the equilibrium
payoff for each type is zero. Figure 1b illustrates the support of the equilibrium. For each type,
the bar indicates intervals of bids on which that type is active; the type with the highest posterior
estimation of the value, t3, is active only on the highest and the lowest interval of bids, but not at
intermediate bids.
The support shown in Figure 1b is unique, but how the probability mass allocated to α3 is
distributed is underdetermined. The most straightforward solution is uniform randomization, with
densities
(
15
4
, 9
4
, 3
4
, 5
4
)
for each of the types, respectively, over the interval
[
0, 4
15
]
. Another possi-
bility is randomization with densities (3, 3, 0, 2) on
[
0, 2
15
]
, and then with densities
(
9
2
, 3
2
, 3
2
, 1
2
)
on[
2
15
, 4
15
]
. Indeed, any density function pi0(b) :
[
0, 4
15
] → [3, 5] with ∫ 415
0
pi0(b)db = 1 corresponds
to an equilibrium with densities on
[
0, 4
15
]
given by (pi0(b), 6− pi0(b), pi0(b)− 3, 5− pi0(b)).
In the equilibria of this game, the order of active sets and the interval lengths corresponding
to them are uniquely determined. Further, the portion of the behavior strategy corresponding to
all but α3 is also the same for all equilibria. The total probability mass assigned to α3 is the same
for all equilibria, but there are infinitely many ways in which that mass can be distributed over the
corresponding interval of bids.
The number of paths through Γ to be considered grows rapidly in K. For K = 8, there are
909,238 possible paths through the graph; the graph is too large to be visualized in a figure in any
practical way. Figure 2 displays the unique equilibrium support for this case. Further, the main
qualitative results from the K = 3 and K = 8 cases can be established to hold more generally. In
particular, the presence of gaps in the equilibrium support for most types, the diagonal banding of
the component intervals in the supports from top right to bottom left, and the non-uniqueness of
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Figure 2: Schematic of equilibrium support in the common-values with highly correlated types
model with K = 8. Bars indicate intervals of bids on which the corresponding type is active.
Horizontal dashing indicates bids at which the active set changes.
equilibrium behavior in the lowest interval, all remain.
We now formalize some properties of the equilibrium structure which are independent of K.
First note that if µk = 0 on some interval, then the strategic calculations for types below tk and
those above tk can be considered in isolation. We define an isolated group of types as a set of types
{tk, . . . , tk′} which are all active for k′ > k, but where tk−1 and tk′+1 are inactive.
Proposition 8. In Example 1, the isolated groups in any admissible active set fall into these cate-
gories: (i) singleton types; (ii) even-parity groups of adjacent interior types; (iii) all types from t0
to tk for any 0 ≤ k ≤ K.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The fact that odd-parity isolated groups of interior types cannot be part of an admissible active
set implies that, for any K and in any equilibrium, there will be gap subpaths for some types in the
corresponding path through Γ. If in moving from αj to αj+1 type tk goes from active to inactive,
then it must be that both tk−1 and tk+1 are active in αj+1.
Proposition 9. In Example 1, if an interior type tk 6∈ A for someA ∈ A and
∑
l:tl∈T ψl|kµ
A
l −LA >
0 on A, then tk−1 ∈ A and tk+1 ∈ A.
Proof. See Appendix B.
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Finally, the set of all types is always an admissible active set. There is always a two-dimensional
set of supporting solutions on this active set, but as the number of types increases, randomization
on an interval corresponding to this active set necessarily tends toward uniform randomization.
Proposition 10. In Example 1, the active set consisting of all types is always admissible, and has a
two-dimensional set of supporting solutions. For all K ≥ 3, let GK be the game with K types, and
for each K let (LK , µK) be a supporting solution for the active set consisting of all types. Then,
limK→∞
µK0
2KLK
= ln 2.
Proof. See Appendix B.
To close out the example, we note again that in the first-price auction with common values and
the same information structure, the equilibrium is monotonic, and therefore a bidder with a higher
type always wins when bidding against an opponent with a lower type. In contrast, in the all-pay
auction, the lower-type bidder wins a substantial proportion of the time in such a contingency.
In this model, there is a 50% chance bidders will be different types. Conditional on this event
occurring, the lower-type bidder wins 12.78% of the time when K = 3, and 17.52% of the time
when K = 8.
4.2 Example 2: Correlated private values and multiplicity of equilibrium
supports
To affirm that the main features of the equilibrium in Example 1 are not dependent on the assump-
tion of common values, we consider an example with similar structure, but with affiliated private
values, similar to Kagel et al. (1987).
Example 2. Retain as before that there are K ≥ 3 states of nature and K + 1 types, and that
conditional on state ωk, each bidder is independently either type tk−1 or tk with equal probability.
However, instead of the state determining the common value, now let the bidders have private
values, determined by their types, with Vk,l = k+1K+1 .
For brevity we do not replicate the analogues of the characterization of equilibrium properties
provided in Example 1. We do note, however, that the set of all types can never be an admissible
active set. Consequently, some types must receive positive expected payoffs in equilibrium. In
such equilibria, odd-indexed types have positive equilibrium payoffs, while even-indexed types
receive zero in equilibrium. Further, each admissible active set is supported by a unique profile of
densities, and therefore each equilibrium support corresponds to exactly one equilibrium behavior
strategy, with piecewise-uniform randomization for every type.
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Figure 3: Schematics of the two equilibrium supports in the correlated private-values model when
K = 8. Bars indicate intervals of bids on which the corresponding type is active. Horizontal
dashing indicates bids at which the active set changes.
In games in this family, there can be multiple equilibrium supports. Figure 3 depicts the two
equilibrium supports for the case of K = 7, which can be compared with Figure 2 from Example
1. The non-monotonicity of the corresponding equilibrium bidding functions implies the outcome
of the auction is inefficient with positive probability, in contrast to the winner-pay auction case.
As in Example 1, there is a 50% chance bidders will be different types. Conditional on this event
occurring, the lower-type bidder wins 15.50% of the time in the equilibrium illustrated in the left
panel of Figure 3, and 15.12% of the time in the one illustrated in the right panel. Each instance
of mis-allocation has an impact of 1
K+1
. If the higher-value bidder always won the auction, the
expected surplus would be 0.59375. The ex-ante equilibrium loss of surplus in the equilibrium
illustrated in the left panel of Figure 3 is 0.00969 and in the right panel is 0.00945, implying that
98.37% and 98.41% of the potential surplus to the bidders from winning the auction is achieved
in the respective equilibria. For comparison, random allocation would lead to an efficiency of
94.74%.12
The assumption that each state of the world can generate only two types, and therefore that the
conditional probabilities hl|k are zero for l 6∈ {k − 1, k, k + 1}, is useful for analytical tractability.
This can be relaxed without changing the qualitative features of the supports shown in Figures 2
12We focus for this example on allocative efficiency. There may be other criteria for evaluating the equilibrium of
an all-pay auction, for example depending on whether high bids are desired by the auction designer or society (for
example, efforts in a sporting contest), or something which may be socially wasteful (for example, expenditures in
lobbying games).
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and 3.13
4.3 Example 3: KMS and equilibrium selection
Baye et al. (1996) showed that when two bidders have a commonly-known and identical value v for
the prize, in equilibrium the bidders randomize uniformly on the interval [0, v]. In this model, v can
either be thought of as a value which is known with certainty by both bidders, or that bidders have
access to the same prior information and form the same expected value based on that information.
In this example we explore the relationship between these two cases, by considering a highly-
competitive case where the values are known with almost-certainty, compared to a case where
only very noisy information is received by the bidders.
Example 3a. Suppose there are K ≥ 2 possible realizations of a common value {v0, . . . , vK−1}.
There are K types {t0, . . . , tK−1}. When the true state is vk, a bidder is type tk with probability pc.
All other types are equally likely, and occur with probability pw. We assume pc > pw so that type
tk can be thought of as being the “correct” type given vk, and by necessity pc + (K − 1)pw = 1.
Straightforward calculations show that for all types tk
ψk|k = hk|kVk,k = vkp2c +
 ∑
m:tm∈T\{tk}
vm
 p2w,
and for all pairs of types tk and tl with tk 6= tl,
ψl|k = hl|kVk,l = (vk + vl)pcpw +
 ∑
m:tm∈T\{tk,tl}
vm
 p2w.
The KMS monotonicity assumption holds if and only if pw
pc
> vk
vk+1
for all k < K; that is, when
information about the value is relatively noisy.
Proposition 11. In Example 3a, there is a unique equilibrium, in which (i) each type randomizes
over a connected support; (ii) on each interval, all types between tl and tk are active, for some
0 ≤ l ≤ k ≤ K − 1.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Equilibrium in this setting has an interesting, and perhaps counterintuitive, implication about
behavior when pc is low. Consider the case where K = 5. Figure 4 depicts the cases of accurate
13The companion software includes an implemented example where there can be more than two types per state of
the world.
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(a) Graph of admissible active sets, for pc = 0.21, pc = 0.45, and pc = 0.99.
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(b) Graph of equilibrium supports, for pc = 0.21, pc = 0.45, and pc = 0.99. Bars indicate intervals of bids
on which the corresponding type is active. Horizontal dashing indicates bids at which the active set changes.
Figure 4: Complexity of the graph of admissible active sets and structure of the equilibrium of
Example 3a for the case of K = 5, as a function of pc.
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and inaccurate information. For each setting, the graph of admissible active sets is shown, as well
as the support of the unique equilibrium.
When the probability that the type corresponds with the value is high, i.e., pw → 0, then there
is a unique equilibrium, which converges to the Baye et al. (1996) equilibrium. For pw sufficiently
small, a bid of zero is in the support of all types. Expected payoffs are therefore zero for all types,
and so the expected sum of bids equals the expected value of the prize; it follows that the expected
sum of bids is maximized by having perfectly accurate information.
However, when pw → pc, the equilibrium does not converge to the Baye et al. (1996) equi-
librium. Instead, the limiting equilibrium is separating, in that bidders who are a “higher” type
always outbid those who are a “lower” one. This limiting separating equilibrium is, in fact, an
equilibrium of the game with pw = pc. Although a bidder’s type provides no information regard-
ing the value of the prize, it can serve as a coordination device. All that is required for equilibrium
in this case is for a bidder to believe that he is facing a uniform distribution of bids; because the
type of the other bidder is not payoff-relevant, how that distribution of bids is realized as a function
of the other bidder’s type is not important. Therefore, any bidding strategy such that the ex-ante
distribution of bids by a bidder is uniform is an equilibrium of this game.
This selection is counterintuitive in that, in the limiting case in which one’s type provides no
information about the value of the prize, the simplest behavior would be to use a type-independent
strategy. However, for this game, and indeed for any similar common-value game where KMS is
satisfied when types contain little information about the common value, the limiting equilibrium
will be one in which bidders play a monotonic, fully-separating strategy. There are, however, per-
turbations of the Baye et al. (1996) model, in which types are arbitrarily close to being completely
uninformative about the value, but nevertheless do not satisfy KMS and therefore select in the limit
the type-independent equilibrium.
Example 3b. Modify Example 3a by assuming that, conditional on value vk, with probability
1 − ε both bidders are type tk, for some fixed ε > 0. Otherwise, the type is uniformly distributed
over the possible types, with the randomization being realized independently for each bidder.
In the case where both bidders are the same type tk,
ψk|k = hk|kVk,k = (1− ε)vk + ε
K
V .
If bidders are different types tk 6= tl, the case of uninformative types must have occurred, and
so immediately ψk|l = hk|lVl,k = εKV . With this structure, KMS does not hold for any value of
ε, because for any triple of types tk−1, tk, and tk+1, ψk+1|k = ψk−1|k, with ψk|k differing from
both. As a result, even when the probability of the “correct” type is only slightly greater than an
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incorrect one, but the incidence of the correct type is correlated between bidders, the equilibrium
corresponding to Baye et al. (1996) is selected.
Proposition 12. In Example 3b, the following are true of admissible active sets:
1. Any subset of types forms an admissible active set;
2. For each active set, there is a unique vector of densities that is consistent with equilibrium;
3. For each active set, the payoff derivative of inactive types is always negative.
There is a unique equilibrium, in which each type tk randomizes over a connected interval [0, Bk],
with Bk strictly increasing in k.
Proof. See Appendix B.
4.4 Example 4: Equilibrium with non-monotonic maximum bids
KMS requires that the good news from being a “higher” type outweighs any information that being
the higher type brings about the anticipated strength of competition. In the examples considered so
far, while stochastic monotonicity of the equilibrium bidding strategies fails and therefore higher
types no longer win with probability one, nevertheless there is a monotonic relationship between
the maximum bid in the support of each type’s equilibrium bidding strategy, and that type’s pos-
terior (expected) value of the prize conditional on being that type. To bring into focus the role of
the expected strength of competition, we now present an example in which there are pairs of types
tk and tl, such that the value of the prize is higher for tl than for tk, but nevertheless the maximum
equilibrium bid of tl is less than tk.
Let there be 2K types {t0, . . . , t2K−1}, with private values Vk,l = k+12K for 0 ≤ k, l ≤ 2K − 1.
All types are ex ante equally likely for each bidder, but types are correlated in that they tend to occur
in pairs, as follows. For all 0 ≤ j < K, let h2j|2j = h2j+1|2j+1 = p and h2j|2j+1 = h2j+1|2j = p,
with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
2
. For any other pairs of types tk and tl, hl|k = 1−2p2K−2 . In this setting, types t0
and t1 face the same distribution of types of the opposing bidder, as do types t2 and t3. However,
the distribution of opposing types differs between t1 and t2. If p is close to one-half, then type t1
believes the other bidder is most likely to be type t0 or t1, and therefore it is most likely she has
either the same or a slightly higher value than her opponent; but, type t2 believes the other bidder
is most likely type t2 or t3, and therefore it is most likely she has either the same or a slightly lower
value than her opponent.
Figure 5 shows the unique equilibrium for the case where there are 2K = 8 types and p = 49
100
.
Within each pair of types, the higher type always outbids the lower type. Across pairs, type t3’s
maximum bid is strictly greater than that of type t4, and type t5’s is strictly greater than that of type
t6.
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Figure 5: The support of the unique equilibrium in a private-values setting with 2K = 8 types,
where increasing from an odd-indexed to an even-indexed type implies a larger upward shift in the
expected type of the other bidder. Bars indicate intervals of bids on which the corresponding type
is active. Horizontal dashing indicates bids at which the active set changes.
4.5 Example 5: Identity-dependent valuations and cycles in the active set
graph
Consider an all-pay auction among association football fans from three nations: Argentina, Brazil,
and England. Suppose the satisfaction a bidder feels at winning will depend on the nation his
opponent comes from. One might imagine that an Englishman would obtain the most satisfaction
by winning against a Brazilian, because of Brazil’s long success in international football at a game
invented by the English. A Brazilian, on the other hand, might most enjoy a victory over an
Argentine, due to the geographical rivalry between the teams. And, finally, an Argentine might get
the most satisfaction out of a win against an Englishman, motivated by the ongoing dispute over
the Falklands/Malvinas.14
Example 5. A valuation structure that encodes such rivalrous motives with three types {t0, t1, t2}
is V0,0 = V1,1 = V2,2 = 2; V0,2 = V1,0 = V2,1 = 3; and V0,1 = V1,2 = V2,0 = 1. Assuming for
simplicity that types are independently determined and equally likely, then ψ2|0 > ψ0|0 > ψ1|0,
ψ0|1 > ψ1|1 > ψ2|1, and ψ1|2 > ψ2|2 > ψ0|2, and as a result there is a cycle {t0}  {t1}  {t2} 
14Identity-dependent payoffs have been studied in the all-pay auction in the complete information case by Klose
and Kovenock (2015).
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{t0} in the graph Γ.15 Γ has two disconnected components: the cycle among the singleton types,
and an isolated node {t0, t1, t2} with all types active.
This game has two families of equilibria. There is one equilibrium in which all three types
randomize uniformly on the interval [0, 2]. Then, there are infinitely many isolated equilibria
which correspond to the cycle among the three singleton types. For each type tk, the supporting
solutions for the active set Ak ≡ {tk} require that 23µAkk = LAk . An equilibrium can be found
using the path {A0, A1, A2}, where A2 is the active set on bids in
[
0, 2
3
]
; A1 on
[
2
3
, 4
3
]
, and A0 on[
4
3
, 2
]
, with the active type on each interval randomizing with density 3
2
. Analogous equilibria can
be constructed from the paths {A1, A2, A0} and {A2, A0, A1}.
Now consider the path α ≡ {A0, A1, A2, A0, A1, A2}. The supporting solutions combined with
the integrate-to-one conditions require that Lα0 + Lα3 = 2
3
, Lα1 + Lα4 = 2
3
, and Lα2 + Lα5 = 2
3
.
There are gap subpaths for each type; the gap subpath constraint (6) for type t0 implies Lα1 = Lα2 ;
for type t1, implies Lα2 = Lα3; and for type t2, implies Lα3 = Lα4 . This determines that Lαj = 13
for all j = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. One can generate a path involving as many iterations of the cycle as
desired, with the result that, if the path is such that each active set appears exactly n times, then
the equilibrium involves each element of the path being assigned an interval of bids of length 2
3n
.
The cycle does not need to be iterated an integral number of times to generate an equilibrium.
The path α ≡ {A0, A1, A2, A0} requires that Lα0 + Lα3 = 23 , Lα1 = 23 , and Lα2 = 23 . However,
there are no further constraints on Lα0 and Lα3; any allocation of the total length of 2
3
between
those two elements of the path corresponds to an equilibrium.
In all these cases, while there are multiple equilibria corresponding to different numbers of
traversals (or partial traversals) of the cycle in Γ, all involve the same total measure of bids being
allocated to each of the three singleton admissible active sets. It is in this sense that one can restrict
attention to paths which feature each gap subpath at most one time; any equilibrium in which a gap
subpath appears multiple times will have the same lengths of bids and probability masses assigned
to each active set, but will differ only in how those are mapped onto specific bids.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines symmetric, two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent values and a
general distribution of types. We assume a finite set of types, and a continuous strategy space.
Our contribution is to relax monotonicity assumptions on types, which then allows, inter alia, for
15A minimum of three types is required to generate a cycle. Suppose there are only two types, fix an equilibrium Π,
and consider some gap in the equilibrium support of a type tk. It must be that there are at least two intervals involved
in such a gap; on one it must be that uk(b|Π) is decreasing, and another on which uk(b|Π) is increasing. If there are
only two types t0 and t1, there are three possible active sets: {t0}, {t1}, and {t0, t1}. In any possible cycle involving
these three active sets, no type can be inactive for two consecutive intervals.
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cases in which an increase in a bidder’s type can be good news about the value of the prize while
also being bad news about the expected level of competitiveness due to a higher valuation by the
other bidder. We show existence of symmetric equilibria with piecewise-uniform randomization,
and provide a characterization of all symmetric equilibria. We also show how to construct all
piecewise-uniform equilibria for any setting, and how information from that construction can be
used to identify the existence of other classes of equilibria.
We therefore provide answers to the discussion in the conclusion of Siegel (2014) regarding the
challenge of identifying equilibria when the monotonicity condition is not satisfied. For examples
with valuation and type distributions drawn from existing literature, construction of the equilib-
rium can be computationally intensive, and equilibria can display an exquisitely rich and complex
structure. We show how using only local information, in the form of admissible active sets, can
help to provide some qualitative understanding of features of possible equilibria. However, in the
absence of a monotonicity condition, constructing an equilibrium involves considering global in-
formation, in the form of solving a system of linear equations over a path of admissible active
sets. The systems of equations corresponding to different paths do not bear any straightforward
relationship to each other in general. The complexity of the graphs that the construction traverses
capture the possible complexity in the equilibrium problem, and, correspondingly, the simplicity
that the monotonicity condition used by Siegel (2014) brings.
The exposition in this paper covers the symmetric case, for notational simplicity and to focus
on properties of non-monotonic equilibria. An extension to the asymmetric case as considered by
Siegel (2014) is straightforward. With asymmetries, an active set consists of the types for both
players for which a bid is a best response, and the admissibility conditions for types of bidder 1
would depend on the probability masses allocated by bidder 2, and vice-versa. In the asymmetric
case, mass points at a bid of zero are possible, as already shown by Siegel (2014), which can be
accommodated by permitting a last entry in a path to have length zero but positive masses for some
types.
There are opportunities to exploit parallel processing in implementing the construction. The
admissibility of each active set and its supporting solutions can be computed independently of
each other, and the traversal of the graph of admissible active sets can be allocated among multiple
processes. Because of this separability of tasks, speedups which are close to linear in the number
of available processors should be attainable. However, in the absence of environment-specific
theoretical results that allow for the pruning of the graph to rule out certain types of paths, the
examples in this paper illustrate that the number of paths to consider can scale exponentially in
the size of the game. In such a case a parallel implementation would in practice be able to solve
slightly larger games in reasonable running times.
Also as in Siegel (2014), the ability to understand properties of candidate equilibria using the
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local information in admissible active sets depends crucially on there being only two bidders.
When there are more than two bidders, equilibrium densities will depend on the bid itself, and not
just on which other types are active. Our exploitation of the existence of equilibria with piecewise-
uniform randomization also does not carry through to the n-player case, as these games do not
have, in general, equilibria involving piecewise-uniform randomization.
A Proofs of general existence results
Proof of Proposition 1
First, it is straightforward that any symmetric equilibrium cannot have a mass point. Consider a
behavior strategy Π where some type tk has Πk({b}) = m > 0 for some bid b. Fix 0 < ε < ψk|k m2 .
Then, the incremental benefit to bidding b+ ε compared to b is at least ψk|k m2 , as a bid b loses a tie
with probability one-half should the other bidder’s type also be tk and the other bidder also bids
b, whereas b + ε wins for sure in those contingencies. The incremental cost of the higher bid is
ε. Therefore, it is strictly better for tk to bid b + ε than b, and therefore Π is not an equilibrium.
Because Π does not have mass points, the payoff function uk(b|Π) is continuous in b.
A function f is Lipschitz-continuous if there exists a constant K ≥ 0 such that |f(x2)−f(x1)|
x2−x1 ≤
K for all x1 and x2. To show that in any symmetric equilibrium uk(b|Π) and Πk([0, b)) are
Lipschitz-continuous in b for all tk, we proceed by contradiction. Pick some equilibrium Π
and some type tk and consider the payoff function uk(b|Π). Suppose uk(b|Π) is not Lipschitz-
continuous. Pick some K > |T |maxtk,tl∈T ψl|kψl|l . Then there must exist two bids b and b + ε for
ε > 0 such that
|uk(b+ ε|Π)− uk(b|Π)|
ε
> K∣∣∣∣∣∑
l:tl∈T
ψl|k [Πl([0, b+ ε))− Πl([0, b))]− ε
∣∣∣∣∣ > Kε. (7)
Note that the case of ties can be neglected as Π has already been shown not to have mass points.
Because Π([0, b)) is nondecreasing in b, the term inside the absolute value can be no smaller than
−ε; because K > 1 by choice, the only way for inequality (7) to be satisfied is if the term inside
the absolute value is positive. This implies∣∣∣∣∣∑
l:tl∈T
ψl|k [Πl([0, b+ ε))− Πl([0, b))]
∣∣∣∣∣ > Kε.
The absolute value signs on the left are superfluous, as the sum is nonnegative. One of the terms
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in the sum must be least as big as the average of all the terms; therefore there exists some type tl′
(which may or may not be tk) such that
Πl′([0, b+ ε))− Πl′([0, b)) > Kε|T |ψl′|k . (8)
Consider the behavior strategy Πl′ of tl′ . Define
β = sup{a ≥ b : Πl′([0, a)) = Πl′([0, b))}
β = inf{a ≤ b+ ε : Πl′([0, a)) = Πl′([0, b+ ε)).}
Because Π has no mass points, β < β, and in order for Π to be an equilibrium, the continuity of
ul′(b|Π) requires that ul′(β|Π) = ul′(β|Π). Inequality (8) and the definitions of β and β imply
Πl′([0, β))− Πl′([0, β)) > Kε|T |ψl′|k .
Recalling that ψl′|l′ > 0,
ψl′|l′
[
Πl′([0, β))− Πl′([0, β))
]
>
Kε
|T | ·
ψl′|l′
ψl′|k∑
l:tl∈T
ψl|l′
[
Πl([0, β))− Πl([0, β))
]− (β − β) > Kε|T | · ψl′|l′ψl′|k − (β − β)
ul′(β|Π)− ul′(β|Π) >
(
K
|T | ·
ψl′|l′
ψl′|k
− 1
)
ε > 0,
which contradicts the assumption that Π is an equilibrium. Therefore uk(b|Π) is Lipschitz-continuous
in b for all types tk.
To show Lipschitz-continuity of Πk([0, b)) in b, we again argue by contradiction. For any
K > ψ−1k|k there exist bids b and b+ ε with ε > 0 such that
Πk([0, b+ ε))− Πk([0, b)) > Kε,
where the monotonicity of Πk permits omission of the absolute value sign. It then follows that
ψk|k [Πk([0, b+ ε))− Πk([0, b))] > ψk|kKε∑
l:tl∈T
ψl|k [Πl([0, b+ ε))− Πl([0, b))]− ε > (ψk|kK − 1)ε
uk(b+ ε|Π)− uk(b|Π)
ε
> ψk|kK − 1,
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which contradicts the Lipschitz-continuity of uk(b|Π).
Proof of Proposition 2
Let G denote the all-pay auction game. What prohibits the immediate application of the Fan-
Glicksberg fixed-point theorem to establish existence of an equilibrium is that the payoff function
is discontinuous in the case of strategies which place a mass point on some bid for some type.
We define a sequence of perturbed games {Gj}∞j=1.16 These are obtained by supposing that,
instead of the higher bid winning with probability one, a bidder may now win with positive proba-
bility even when his bid is slightly lower than the other bidder’s. Specifically, in game Gj , we add,
independent of each bidder’s bid, a uniform random variable on [−1/j,+1/j]. It is these perturbed
bids that are used to determine which bidder wins the auction. The cost for each bidder remains
their unperturbed bids.
Let Π˜jl (b; Πl) denote the probability that bid b wins, in game G
j , conditional on the other
bidder being type tl, assuming the “intended” distribution of bids by the other bidder is given by
the behavior strategy Π. Then the expected payoff to a bidder of type tk who bids b against Π is
given by
ujk(b|Π) =
∑
l:tl∈T
ψl|kΠ˜
j
l (b; Πl)− b.
Because of the addition of the continuous random noise, this payoff function is continuous. There-
fore, the Fan-Glicksberg fixed-point theorem guarantees the existence of a symmetric equilibrium
Πj in this game. For each equilibrium Πj let θj = (θjk)k:tk∈T denote the corresponding vector of
equilibrium payoffs for each type.
Passing to a subsequence if necessary, the equilibria {Πj} converge to some limit Π?.17 Further,
because the vector of equilibrium payoffs is in a compact set, we can, if necessary, consider a
further subsequence such that the vector of equilibrium payoffs converges to some limit θ?. We
will argue that Π? is in fact an equilibrium of the original all-pay auction game G.
Lemma 13. For any two bids b2 > b1,
Π?k([0,b2))−Π?k([0,b1))
b2−b1 ≤ 2ψk|k .
Proof. The argument is by contradiction. Suppose for some type tk, there exist bids b2 > b1
with Π
?
k([0,b2))−Π?k([0,b1))
b2−b1 >
2
ψk|k
. Without loss of generality, we can assume b1 and b2 are points
of continuity of Π?k([0, b)).
18 For each game Gj and corresponding equilibrium Πj , let Sjk be the
16This technique is also used by Govindan and Wilson (2010), who consider the case of a continuum of types.
17Recall that the set of behavior strategies is endowed with the topology of weak convergence.
18If b2 is not a point of continuity, the inequality will continue to be satisfied by picking b′2 = b2 + δ for sufficiently
small δ > 0. If b1 is not a point of continuity, the inequality will continue to be satisfied by picking b′1 = b1 − δ for
sufficiently small δ > 0. To ensure the case of b1 = 0 is covered, by convention we take Π?([0, b)) = 0 for bids b < 0.
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support of Πjk, and define β
j
k
= inf{b : b ∈ Sjk ∩ [b1, b2]}. Because ujk(b|Πj) is continuous in b,
ujk(β
j
k
|Πj) = θjk and therefore βjk is a best reply for tk against Πj in game Gj .
Because b2 is a point of continuity of Π?k, Π˜
j
k(b2; Π
j
k)→ Π?k([0, b2)). We claim that
lim
j→∞
Π˜jk(β
j
k
; Πjk) ≤ Π?k([0, b1)) +
1
2
Π?k([b1, b2)). (9)
If βj
k
→ b1, this follows immediately as b1 is a point of continuity of Π?k. If not, then there exists
some J such that, for all j > J , b1 + 2J < β
j
k
< b2− 2J . For all these Gj and Πj , bid βjk beats bid b1
with certainty even after the perturbation; beats a bid of βj
k
exactly one-half of the time; and beats
all bids in (βj
k
, βj
k
+ 2
J
] with probability less than one-half. Therefore for all j > J ,
Π˜jk(β
j
k
; Πjk) ≤ Πjk([0, b1)) +
1
2
Πjk
([
βj
k
, βj
k
+
2
J
])
≤ Πjk([0, b1)) +
1
2
Πjk
([
βj
k
, b2
))
.
Passing to the limit as j →∞ gives (9).
Taken together, we now have that
lim
j→∞
ψk|k
[
Π˜jk(b2; Π
j
k)− Π˜jk(βjk; Π
j
k)
]
≥ ψk|k
[
Π?k([0, b2))− Π?k([0, b1))−
1
2
Π?k([b1, b2))
]
=
ψk|k
2
[Π?k([0, b2))− Π?k([0, b1))] > b2 − b1.
The payoff difference between b2 and βjk in profile Π
j is
ujk(b2|Πj)− ujk(βjk|Πj) =
∑
l:tl∈T
ψl|k
[
Π˜jl (b2; Π
j
l )− Π˜jl (βjk; Π
j
l )
]
− (b2 − βjk)
≥ ψk|k
[
Π˜jk(b2; Π
j
k)− Π˜jk(βjk; Π
j
k)
]
− (b2 − b1).
Taking the limits of both sides,
lim
j→∞
ujk(b2|Πj)− ujk(βjk|Πj) ≥
ψk|k
2
[Π?k([0, b2))− Π?k([0, b1))]− (b2 − b1) > 0.
This implies that there exists some J such that for all j > J , ujk(b2|Πj) > ujk(βjk|Πj). This means
that b2 is a strictly better reply than βjk for type tk against Π
j in game Gj , which contradicts that
Πj is an equilibrium of Gj .
An immediate consequence of Lemma 13 is that Π?k([0, b)) is Lipschitz-continuous in b, and
therefore all payoff functions uk(b|Π?) are Lipschitz-continuous in b. Further, the functions ujk(b|Πj)
converge to uk(b|Π?) (taking a subsequence if necessary). We now establish the limiting Π? is in
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fact an equilibrium of the original game.
First, suppose that there exists some type tk and some bid b which obtains a payoff strictly
higher than θ?k. By continuity, there exists some J such that, for all games G
j with j > J , that
same bid b must also obtain a higher payoff than θjk. This contradicts that Π
j is an equilibrium of
Gj .
Next, consider a type tk and a bid b which is strictly suboptimal for tk in Π?. Because Π?
cannot have mass points, there must be an open neighborhood around b such that all bids in the
neighborhood are also strictly suboptimal. Because the equilibrium payoff functions converge, it
follows that there exists some J such that for all games Gj with j > J , all bids in some neighbor-
hood of b are suboptimal. Therefore, the corresponding equilibria Πj must place zero probability
mass on the interval, and therefore the limiting equilibrium Π? must also place zero probability
mass on the interval.
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider an equilibrium Π, and suppose that over some interval (e, e + L) such that (e, e + L) ∩
E(Π) = ∅, the active types randomize using a distribution that is not uniform over that interval.
Because Π is an equilibrium, equations (2) are satisfied. Let A be the active set on the interval,
and for each active type tk ∈ A, define pik = Πk([0,e+L])−Πk([0,e])L , with pik = 0 for inactive types.
Consider a new strategy profile Πˆ, such that, for any measurable set B of bids, Πˆk(B) = pikλ(B ∩
(e, e+L))+Πk(B∩ (R+\(e, e+L))), where λ(·) is the Lebesgue measure. We claim that Πˆ must
also be an equilibrium.
By construction Πˆ ensures constant payoff for each active tk on (e, e + L). For any b1, b2 ∈
(e, e + L) and any type tl, Πˆl([0, b2)) − Πˆl([0, b1)) = (b2 − b1)pil. Comparing the payoff of b2 to
that of b1,
uk(b2|Πˆ)− uk(b1|Πˆ) =
∑
l:tl∈A
ψl|k
[
Πˆl([0, b2))− Πˆl([0, b1))
]
− (b2 − b1)
=
∑
l:tl∈A
ψl|k(b2 − b1)pil − (b2 − b1)
= (b2 − b1)
[∑
l:tl∈A
ψl|k
Πl([0, e+ L])− Πl([0, e])
L
− 1
]
= 0,
because Π being an equilibrium ensures the expression in square brackets is zero. Because Πˆ([0, e+
L)) = Π([0, e + L)), it follows that θk(Πˆ) = θk(Π) for all tk active on (e, e + L), and all bids in
(e, e+ L) are best responses for tk under Πˆ.
Now consider any type tl not active on (e, e+L). For any bid b ∈ (e, e+L), because Πˆ([0, e+
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L)) = Π([0, e + L)) and Πˆ([0, e)) = Π([0, e)), ul(e + L|Πˆ) = ul(e + L|Π) ≤ θl(Π) and ul(e +
L|Πˆ) = ul(e+L|Π) ≤ θl(Π). Because randomization on (e, e+L) is uniform under Πˆ, ul(b|Πˆ) is
linear in b on (e, e + L), and therefore ul(b|Πˆ) ≤ θl(Π) on (e, e + L). On the other hand, because
all of the best responses under Π for tl lie outside (e, e + L), and Πˆ([0, b)] = Π([0, b)] for all
b 6∈ (e, e+ L), it follows that θl(Πˆ) = θl(Π).
Because Π and Πˆ differ only by redistributing probability mass within (e, e + L), for all bids
b 6∈ (e, e + L), ul(b|Πˆ) = ul(b|Π). Therefore, there are no bids outside (e, e + L) which are best
responses for any type tl under Πˆ which are not best responses for that tl also under Π.
Therefore Πˆ is also an equilibrium. This process can be iterated over any interval where ran-
domization is not uniform. As a result, for any equilibrium Π, there is always some equilibrium
which corresponds to the same path α through the graph Γ of the game, with the same solution
{(Lαj , µαj)}αj∈α, and the same equilibrium payoffs to all players, where randomization is uniform
along each interval of bids (e, e+ L) not containing a point in E(Π).
Proof of Proposition 7
Consider an equilibrium Π in which some type tk randomizes over more than |Xk| + 1 disjoint
intervals. Let α be the corresponding path through Γ and {(Lαj , µαj)}αj∈α denote the lengths and
probability masses for each type along α. We argue that we can construct another equilibrium Πˆ
corresponding to a different (but related) path αˆ, with a solution {(Lˆαˆj , µˆαˆj)}αˆj∈αˆ.
Because each gap in the support between intervals corresponds to a gap subpath in Γ, some gap
subpath ξ ∈ Xk must appear more than once in α. Remembering that a gap subpath is defined as
a particular list of admissible active sets visited in order, there must be a cycle in Γ. Any directed
graph can be partitioned into strongly connected components; within each component, any node
can be reached from any other node. Further, because the component is strongly connected, it is
possible to visit all the nodes in the component without repeating a cycle.19 Finally, the partition of
the graph can itself be viewed as an acyclic directed graph; once a path through the graph departs
a given partition, it can never return.
Define a new path αˆ by following the path α, but omitting any traversals of a cycle after the
first one. Because any given cycle of admissible active sets is visited at most once, any given gap
subpath appears in αˆ at most once. Because only multiple traversals of a cycle are omitted, αˆ visits
exactly the same active sets as α.
The solution {(Lαj , µαj)}αj∈α induces an assignment (4) of measures of bids and probability
mass over active sets via (5). Remember that other than the constraints placed by the gap sub-
path equations (6), if an active set appears two or more times in a path, the measures of bid and
19This follows because any strongly connected directed graph has an ear decomposition.
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probability mass can be subdivided arbitrarily among the appearances of the active set on the path.
Because αˆ visits exactly the same active sets as α, this induced assignment from the solution on α
also satisfies the equilibrium conditions for αˆ.
In α, for any gap subpath ξ appearing more than once, the equilibrium equations require an
instance of an equation of the form (6) for each appearance. If ξ does not appear in αˆ, then there
is no constraint of the form (6) to satisfy. If it does appear, then let (j, n) denote the indices in
αˆ where ξ appears, and let (ji, ni) denote the indices of the ith instance of ξ in α. Then, for all
1 ≤ j′ ≤ n − j, let Lˆαˆj+j′ = ∑i Lαji+j′ and µˆαˆj+j′k = ∑i µαji+j′k for all k : tk ∈ T . In words,
the proposed solution on αˆ coalesces all of the bid measures and probability mass allocated to the
various instances of the gap subpath in α to the one instance of the gap subpath in αˆ. Note that this
does not change the total probability mass or measure of bids assigned to each admissible active
set.
Therefore, it is possible to construct a solution {(Lˆαˆj , µˆαˆj)}αˆj∈αˆ based on αˆ using an equilib-
rium solution {(Lαj , µαj)}αj∈α on α, and the solution on αˆ continues to satisfy all the requirements
of equilibrium. Therefore, an equilibrium exists which traverses each gap subpath in the graph at
most one time.
B Other Proofs
Proofs for Section 4.1
Proof of Proposition 8
The following facts are useful in several of the arguments below. Both can be shown by straight-
forward induction arguments.
Fact (Fact EVEN). Let A be an admissible active set, and suppose {tk, . . . , tk+2j−1} are interior
types which comprise an isolated group within A, for any 1 ≤ k < K and any j > 0. Then,
supporting solutions for A satisfy
k
2
(µAk−1 + µ
A
k ) =
k + 2j
2
(µAk+2j−1 + µ
A
k+2j).
Fact (Fact ODD). LetA be an admissible active set, and suppose {tk, . . . , tk+2j} are interior types
which comprise an isolated group within A, for any 1 ≤ k < K and any j ≥ 0. Then, supporting
solutions for A satisfy
k
2
(µAk−1 + µ
A
k ) =
LA
∆
− k + 2j + 1
2
(µAk+2j + µ
A
k+2j+1).
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Lemma 14. No isolated group of an odd number of interior types can be part of an admissible
active set.
Proof. Let A be an admissible active set, and suppose {tk, . . . , tk+2j} is an isolated group of types
in A, for any j ≥ 1. For all i < j, the admissibility equation for type tk+2i from (3), combined
with Fact EVEN, gives
kµAk + (k + 2i+ 1)(µ
A
k+2i + µ
A
k+2i+1) = 2∆
−1LA.
For all i < j, the admissibility equation for type tk+2i−1, combined with Fact ODD, gives
kµAk + (k + 2i)(µ
A
k+2i−1 + µ
A
k+2i) = 0.
In matrix form, the system of equations required to satisfy all the associated admissibility condi-
tions can be written CµA = d, with
C =

2k + 1 k + 1 0 0 · · · 0
k −(k + 2) −(k + 2) 0 · · · 0
k 0 k + 3 k + 3 · · · 0
...
... . . . . . . . . .
...
k 0 · · · 0 −(k + 2j) −(k + 2j)
k 0 · · · · · · 0 k + 2j + 1

, d =

2∆−1LA
0
2∆−1LA
...
0
2∆−1LA

.
By Farkas’ Lemma, this system has no nonnegative solution for µA if and only if there exists some
vector y such that CTy ≥ 0 and dTy < 0. The matrix CT does not have full rank, so there will be
multiple solutions to CTy = 0. We can write CTy = 0 row-wise as
(2k + 1)y1 + k
2j+1∑
m=2
ym = 0
(k + 2i− 1)y2i−1 − (k + 2i)y2i = 0 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ j
−(k + 2i)y2i + (k + 2i+ 1)y2i+1 = 0 ∀ 1 ≤ i < j
The equations generated by the last two lines imply
yn =
(
k + 2j + 1
k + n
)
y2j+1 ∀ 2 ≤ n ≤ 2j
To obtain dTy < 0 we only require that the sum of the odd-indexed entries in y be negative. We
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have
j∑
i=1
y2i−1 = − k
2k + 1
j∑
i=1
y2i +
k + 1
2k + 1
j∑
i=1
y2i+1
= − k
2k + 1
j∑
i=1
k + 2j + 1
k + 2i
y2j+1 +
k + 1
2k + 1
j∑
i=1
k + 2j + 1
k + 2i+ 1
y2j+1.
=
k + 2j + 1
2k + 1
y2j+1
j∑
i=1
[
− k
k + 2i
+
k + 1
k + 2i+ 1
]
.
As the term in square brackets is positive, the sign of dTy is determined by the sign of y2j+1.
Because y2j+1 can be chosen freely because CTy does not have full rank, choosing any y2j+1 < 0
generates the required condition. Therefore, the original system does not have a solution with
nonnegative µA, and the claim follows.
Lemma 15. Any isolated group of all types between t0 and tm can be part of an admissible active
set, for any 0 ≤ m ≤ K. For any such group, for all k ≤ m, the supporting solution satisfies
µAk−1 + µ
A
k =
LA
k∆
.
Proof. We proceed by induction. For the base case k = 0, given an admissible active set A, the
admissibility equation generated by type t0 can be written ∆(µA0 + µ
A
1 ) = L
A. For the induction
step, assume the claim is true for k − 1, and consider type tk. Taking the admissibility condition
for tk with k < K and applying the induction hypothesis,
k
2
(
µAk−1 + µ
A
k
)
+
k + 1
2
(
µAk + µ
A
k+1
)
=
LA
∆
k
2
× 1
k∆
+
k + 1
2
(
µAk + µ
A
k+1
)
=
LA
∆
µAk + µ
A
k+1 =
LA
(k + 1)∆
,
which establishes the result for k and completes the induction step. For tK the solution can be
confirmed by direct calculation.
Now consider type tm−1. We have that µAm−1 +µ
A
m =
LA
m∆
. This, and the admissibility equation
for type tm constitute a 2 × 2 linear system of equations. The unique solution of this system is
µAm =
LA
∆(m+1)
and µAm−1 =
LA
∆m
− LA
∆(m+1)
. Note that both µAm−1 and µ
A
m are positive. Further, given
that for any type tk with k < m, µAk =
LA
(m+1)∆
− µAk+1 all the masses µAk in the solution are strictly
positive.
Lemma 16. No isolated set of all types from tk to tK with 0 < k < K may be simultaneously part
of an admissible active set.
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Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Let A be an admissible active set. By direct calculation,
tK−1 and tK cannot comprise an isolated group within A. Now suppose that all types from tk to tK
do comprise such an isolated group within A, with 0 < k < K − 1. Consider type tK−1. If K − k
is even, Fact EVEN tells us that
k
2
µAk =
K
2
(
µAK−1 + µ
A
K
)
.
Because µAK−1 + µ
A
K = 2L
A, µAk =
LA
2k∆
. By Fact ODD, we know that
k
2
µAk =
LA
∆
−
(
k + 1
2
)(
µAk + µ
A
k+1
)
.
Solving for µAk+1 leaves us with µ
A
k+1 =
LA(2k−1)
2k∆(k+1)
. By Fact EVEN we know that
k
2
µAk =
k + 2
2
(
µAk+1 + µ
A
k+2
)
.
Solving for µAk+2 leaves us with µ
A
k+2 =
LA
2(k+2)4 − L
A(2k−1)
2k4(k+1) , which is only positive if k < 1.
If K − k is odd then Fact ODD tells us that
k
2
µAk =
LA
∆
−
(
K
2
)(
µAK−1 + µ
A
K
)
.
Solving for µAk+1 as above yields µ
A
k+1 =
−LA
k(k+1)∆
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 9
Fix some type tk. Observe that among all admissible active sets A,
µAk
LA
is largest when tk is an
isolated type in A. So, it is enough for us to consider two cases: tk−1 6∈ A and tk+1 ∈ A as an
isolated type, and tk+1 6∈ A and tk−1 ∈ A as an isolated type.
First suppose tk−1 6∈ A and tk+1 ∈ A is an isolated type. Then the admissibility equation
for tk+1 reduces to µAk+1 =
2
2k+3
LA
∆
, and ψk+1|kµAk+1 − LA = L
A
2
× 2k+2
2k+3
− LA < 0, which is a
contradiction. Next suppose tk+1 6∈ A and tk−1 ∈ A is an isolated type. Then the admissibility
equation for tk−1 reduces to µAk−1 =
2
2k−1
LA
∆
, and ψk−1|kµAk−1 −LA = k2k−1LA −LA < 0, which is
a contradiction.
Therefore, both tk−1 and tk+1 must be active, as claimed. When both are active,
ψk−1|kµAk−1 + ψk+1|kµ
A
k+1 − LA =
LA
2
× 8k(k − 1)− 2
4k(k − 1)− 3 − L
A,
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which is positive for k > 1.
Proof of Proposition 10
Consider the active set A consisting of all types {t0, . . . , tK}. The conditions for admissibility
lead to a degeneracy; if the conditions for any K of the types are satisfied, then the admissibility
condition for the other type is automatically satisfied as well. In this case an earlier claim has
shown that µAk−1 + µ
A
k =
LA
k∆
for all k.
For any given choice of µA0 , the recursive relationship can be unrolled to show that µ
A
k =
LA
k∆
− µAk−1 and µAk = µAk−2 − L
A
k(k−1)∆ . We can then state that
µA2k = µ
A
0 −
LA
∆
k∑
j=1
1
2j(2j − 1)
µA2k+1 = µ
A
1 −
LA
∆
k∑
j=1
1
2j(2j + 1)
.
Remembering that µA0 + µ
A
1 =
LA
∆
, in order to ensure that µA2k ≥ 0 and µA2k+1 ≥ 0,
k∑
j=1
1
2j(2j − 1) ≤
µA0
2KLA
≤ 1−
k∑
j=1
1
2j(2j + 1)
.
As k increases, expression on the left increases monotonically, and the one on the right decreases
monotonically. Therefore, for given K, the types tK−1 and tK are the ones which establish the
upper and lower bounds on µ
A
0
LA
, and there is a range of µ
A
0
LA
consistent with equilibrium. As k →∞,
both the left and right sides of the inequality coverge to ln 2. Therefore, for a finely discretized
type space, randomization on this interval is “almost” uniform.
Proofs for Section 4.3
Proof of Proposition 11
Let A be an admissible active set, and consider two types tk and tl; here and throughout this proof
assume k > l. Direct calculation shows that∑
m:tm∈T
ψm|kµAm −
∑
m:tm∈T
ψm|lµAm = (vkpc − vlpw)(pc − pw)µAk + (vkpw − vlpc)(pc − pw)µAl
+(vk − vl)pw(pc − pw)
∑
m:tm∈T\{tk,tl}
µAm. (10)
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The first and third terms on the right side are always positive. The middle term is positive if
pw
pc
> vl
vk
, that is, if the probability that a bidder’s type corresponds to the value with too high a
probability relative to the ratio of values. If this inequality holds for l = k− 1 and all k, then KMS
is satisfied, and therefore only singleton types can be admissible active sets.
Consider some path α through the graph Γ of admissible active sets. For each entry αj in the
path, let λj ≡ min{k : tk ∈ αj} be the smallest type index active in αj . Then, λj is nonincreasing
in j. To see this, suppose that tk is active and tl is inactive. Because µAl = 0, the difference in (10)
is negative, and therefore
∑
m:tm∈T ψm|lµ
A
l < L
A. Therefore, between any two consecutive entries
αj and αj+1, in order for λj 6∈ αj+1, a type with a smaller index must be in αj+1.
Next, suppose both tk and tl are active. Then it must be that
(vkpc − vlpw)µAk + (vkpw − vlpc)µAl < 0,
which implies that
µAk
µAl
<
vlpc − vkpw
vkpc − vlpw < 1,
and therefore µAk < µ
A
l .
Now consider the case where, for some j, tk ∈ αj and tk 6∈ αj+1. We claim that for all active
sets αj′ , j′ > j,
(vkpw − vλj′pc)(pc − pw)µ
αj′
λj′
+ (vk − vλj′ )pw(pc − pw)
∑
m:tm∈T\{tk,tλj′ }
µ
αj′
m > 0.
This must be true by construction on j′ = j + 1 because tk becomes inactive in moving from αj
to αj+1, and α is a path through Γ. Because λj is nonincreasing, both terms in the sum must be
nondecreasing in j. Therefore, once a type tk becomes inactive, it is never active in any subsequent
active set along α, and therefore the support of type tk’s strategy is connected.
Finally, any active set in α contains all types between tl and tk for some l ≤ k. Suppose not,
and tl and tk are active for some l < k but some type tn with l < n < k is not. Because types
must exit in decreasing order of their indices, the number of entries in α on which tn is active
must be fewer than tl. However, for each αj ∈ α, µαjn < µαjl . Because
∑
αj∈α µ
αj
l = 1, then∑
αj∈α µ
αj
n < 1, which violates the equilibrium conditions and forms the contradiction.
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Proof of Proposition 12
Let A be an admissible active set. For any type tk,
∑
m:tm∈T
ψm|kµAm − LA =
εV
K
∑
m:tm∈T\{tk}
µAm + (1− ε)vkµAk − LA.
Active sets consisting of a single type are always admissible, so we consider the case when A is
not a singleton. Fix any tk ∈ A. For each tl ∈ A, with k 6= l, the admissibility equations for A
imply
εV
K
∑
m:tm∈T\{tk}
µAm + (1− ε)vkµAk =
εV
K
∑
m:tm∈T\{tl}
µAm + (1− ε)vlµAl ,
and therefore
vkµ
A
k = vlµ
A
l . (11)
Substituting into the admissibility equation for tk,
εV
K
∑
m:tm∈A\{tk}
vk
vm
µAk + (1− ε)vkµAk = LA. (12)
Pick some LA > 0; there is then some µAk > 0 such that (12) is satisfied. For all other tl ∈ A,
determine µAl > 0 via (11). Therefore, there is a solution to the admissibility conditions for A. As
we have placed no restrictions on the types in A, it follows that all subsets of T are admissible.
Now, suppose that tk ∈ A but tl 6∈ A. Then,∑
m:tm∈T
ψm|kµAm −
∑
m:tm∈T
ψm|lµAm = vkµ
A
k − vlµAl = vkµAk > 0.
Therefore,
∑
m:tm∈T ψm|lµ
A
m < L
A. The implication of this is that along any path α through the
graph Γ of admissible active sets, if a type tk ∈ αj , then tk ∈ αj′ for all j′ ≥ j. As a result,
in any equilibrium, a type tk randomizes over some connected interval [0, Bk] of bids, where Bk
is nondecreasing in k. To show that Bk is strictly increasing in k, we proceed by contradiction.
Suppose there is an equilibrium with Bk = Bl for some k > l. Then, types tk and tl are active on
the same entries in the corresponding path α. For each αj ∈ α, the supporting solution must satisfy
µ
αj
l =
vk
vl
µ
αj
k , so therefore µ
αj
l > µ
αj
k . However, this contradicts the equilibrium requirement that
both
∑
j:αj∈α µ
αj
k = 1 and
∑
j:αj∈α µ
αj
l = 1.
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